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One of the most pleasurable aspects of video games is their ability to induce immersive
experiences. However, there appears to be a tentative conceptualization of what an
immersive experience is. In this short review, we specifically focus on the terms of
flow and immersion, as they are the most widely used and applied definitions in the
video game literature, whilst their differences remain disputable. We critically review the
concepts separately and proceed with a comparison on their proposed differences. We
conclude that immersion and flow do not substantially differ in current studies and that
more evidence is needed to justify their separation.
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INTRODUCTION
Video games offer highly positive experiences and it has been argued that the experience of flow
alone may be responsible for the positive emotions during video game playing (Hoffman and
Novak, 1996; Quinn, 2005; Guo et al., 2012; Nah et al., 2014). Literature, however, assimilates
multiple terms that emulate flow’s richness of an experience – for instance, immersion. Although
immersion presents subtle structural differences from flow, it is believed that they allude to different
mental phenomena (Brown and Cairns, 2004; IJsselsteijn et al., 2007; Jennett et al., 2008b; Nacke
and Lindley, 2008, 2009; Brockmyer et al., 2009; Qin et al., 2009; Drachen et al., 2010; Teng, 2010;
Kiili et al., 2012; Sweetser et al., 2012; Cairns et al., 2014; Denisova et al., 2017; Frochot et al., 2017).
The number of theories that exist for flow and immersion are a testimony to the complex nature of
the underlying mental state.
The overt similarities between flow and immersion are available when examining popular
theories of immersion (e.g., Brown and Cairns, 2004; Ermi and Mäyrä, 2005; Jennett et al.,
2008b; Kiili et al., 2012). For example, concentration, loss of time perception, a balance between
the player’s skills and the game’s demands, and loss of self-awareness are some of the mutual
properties that both flow and immersion exhibit (e.g., Brown and Cairns, 2004). Immersive
experiences during video game playing are still predominantly measured with questionnaires
(Procci and Bowers, 2011; Lee et al., 2014; Bian et al., 2016). These tools often present variability
on the definitional premise upon which they were structured, and thus raise ambiguity over the
validity of what they claim to be capturing. This short review examines the main differences that
have been outlined for flow and immersion and argues that these states might actually be the
same.
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A COMPARISON BETWEEN FLOW AND
IMMERSION
Qualifying the Experience
Immersion is perhaps more popular than flow across academics
and non-academics alike (Smith, 2016) and has a long history
of interpretations (Smith et al., 1998). The debate, however, is
not merely about which term is more appropriate than the other
(Cairns, 2016), but mainly about the sensory, cognitive, and
emotional products of an immersive experience.
Flow theory is often approached from a radical standpoint,
wherein all of its nine proposed dimensions must be present
for the experience to qualify as flow. These dimensions
include balance between the skills of an individual and the
activity’s demands; merging of action and awareness; clear goals;
immediate and unambiguous feedback; concentration on the
task; perceived control over the activity; loss of self-reflection;
distorted perception of time; and intrinsic motivation toward an
activity (autotelic) (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990). Cairns et al.
(2014) have suggested that flow is an “all-or-nothing” experience,
during which the individual either fulfills all the criteria for
flow to kick in, or they do not, in which case flow will not
come into effect. Others have argued that flow does not need
to comply with all the criteria simultaneously (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990, 1998; Quinn, 2005; Chen, 2007; Guo and Poole, 2009;
Heo et al., 2010; Swann et al., 2012; Arzate and Ramirez, 2017;
Frochot et al., 2017). However, the minimum requirements for
an experience to qualify as flow remains unsettled (i.e., the
necessary vs. the sufficient conditions; Swann et al., 2012). For
example, Skadberg and Kimmel (2004) found that the criteria
with the highest factor loadings for flow were enjoyment and time
perception distortion. In contrast, Klasen et al. (2012) found that
the conjunction of balance between challenge and skills, sense of
control and concentration were the most representative of the
flow experience.
This possible limitation in flow theory has been exploited in
favor of new definitions for an immersive experience. However,
it should be noted that Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975, 1990) list of
flow criteria relied on oral report patterns between multiple
interviews. In 1990 (p. 49) he mentioned, “When people reflect on
how it feels when their experience is most positive, they mention
at least one, and often all, of the following. (. . .).” Thus, flow’s
criteria were compiled from a list of the most commonly reported
sensations during flow and might not be universally applicable
to every person or every instance of an activity (e.g., Nakamura
and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). We argue that flow’s dimensions are
more descriptive in nature rather than definitive. Similarly, the
characteristics of each stage in immersion describe the average
immersive episode, but they are not guaranteed (Brown and
Cairns, 2004).
Experiential Extremity
Flow has been referred to as the optimal experience when
nothing else matters (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Jackson and
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). This characterization has led to the
belief that flow is a particularly intense experience, and therefore
extreme (Jennett et al., 2008b; Sanders and Cairns, 2010; Frochot
et al., 2017), which makes immersion an antecedent to flow
(Jennett et al., 2008b; Seah and Cairns, 2008; Brockmyer et al.,
2009; Nacke and Lindley, 2009; Sanders and Cairns, 2010).
Importantly, proponents of this notion have yet to address
how immersion can further descend into flow and to trace the
qualifying elements for such a transition.
Immersion, on the other hand, has been tagged as sub-
optimal, a characterization that has been deemed to be more
suitable for video game playing (Jennett et al., 2008b; Cheng
et al., 2015). Brown and Cairns (2004) identified three grades
of immersion: engagement, engrossment and total immersion,
and argued that total immersion is not always achievable (see
also, Jennett et al., 2008a). Hence, the model of an average
immersive experience in video game playing can be reduced to
the engagement and engrossment levels, whose characteristics
are not considerably divergent from flow. Although immersion
is purported to be a non-extreme state, Brown and Cairns
put forward the concept of total immersion, whose name
also denotes an experiential extremity. This appears to be the
equivalent of Csikszentmihalyi (1992)’s micro-flow and deep-
flow episodes – in this sense, total immersion would qualify as
a deep-flow episode, which occurs more rarely than micro-flow
episodes do.
Given the similarities between flow and immersion, it is not
safe to conclude that flow is more “extreme” than immersion.
The mechanisms, indicative of an extreme experience, are likely
to be concentration, loss of self-reflection, distortion of time
perception and autotelicity, all of which make flow inherently
dissociative from reality. Except for autotelicity, the remaining
dimensions are also found in immersion (e.g., Brown and Cairns,
2004; Jennett et al., 2008b).
To address the last, most distinctive concomitant of the
flow experience, autotelicity, we should note that the term
poses a conflict in itself. On the one hand, it is used to
describe the intrinsic motivation toward an activity, which is
evident from the blend word “auto” and “telos”, i.e., to perform
the activity is a goal in itself (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). This
meaning renders autotelicity antecedent to flow. On the other
hand, autotelicity has been used to denote high satisfaction
derived from an activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) – perhaps a
product of time perception distortion (e.g., Conti, 2001; Rau
et al., 2006; Wood et al., 2007; Luthman et al., 2009; Sackett
et al., 2010). Hence, it is treated as an outcome of flow (e.g.,
Weibel and Wissmath, 2011; Guo et al., 2012; Nah et al.,
2014).
Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1996) mentioned that a person might
not always receive satisfaction whilst engaging in an activity, but
rather immediately after. In video games, it has been argued that
positive and negative emotions are both valid constituents of
an engaging experience (Kaye et al., 2018; Silpasuwanchai and
Ren, 2018). These observations indicate that autotelicity might be
asynchronous to the core flow experience (Quinn, 2005; Engeser
and Schiepe-Tiska, 2012), and conflict with the notion that
flow is more extreme than immersion. Toward a more precise
identification of experiential intensity, it is critical to quantify an
immersive episode by its duration, latency (time taken to trigger
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the episode), intensity, and frequency of breaks (how often the
episodes are interrupted).
The Interplay Between Flow, Immersion,
and Presence
Among the constructs that have been traditionally associated
with video game playing, “presence” often appears in tandem
with both flow and immersion (e.g., McMahan, 2003; Nah et al.,
2014). For clarity, this article uses presence in lieu of “spatial
presence” (for reviews, see Tamborini and Skalski, 2006; Sjölie,
2014). Presence is elicited when the player feels as being in the
game (e.g., Brown and Cairns, 2004; Brockmyer et al., 2009) – it
is considered a highly relevant concept for video game playing
(Tamborini and Skalski, 2006), but its conceptualization is often
confounded with that of immersion (McMahan, 2003).
Immersion theories have incorporated presence to an
extent that it becomes indistinguishable from immersion (e.g.,
McMahan, 2003; Brown and Cairns, 2004; Calleja, 2007; Norman,
2010; Kiili et al., 2012). For example, Brown and Cairns (2004)
have explicitly equated total immersion to presence. Their
framework visualizes immersion as a multi-graded construct,
that intensifies over time, yet presence fails to provide the
quantitative information needed to separate it from earlier,
or less intense, stages of immersion. Moreover, the authors
inferred that engagement and engrossment – which encompass
physical and emotional investment in the game, loss of self-
awareness and sustained attention – prime the experience
of presence. Consequently, the model describes the path to
attaining presence, which is viewed as the core of immersion,
even if players do not always progress into presence (Jennett
et al., 2008a; Skalski et al., 2011). Thus, we suggest that the
model of Brown and Cairns possibly yields an incomplete
taxonomy.
In contrast, the distinction between presence and flow is
perhaps clearer. According to Weibel and Wissmath (2011), flow
is the sensation of influencing the activity in the virtual world
(“gaming action”), whereas presence is the sense of being in the
virtual world. This distinction exposes a fundamental difference:
presence may not necessitate player interaction or physical effort
(Slater and Wilbur, 1997; IJsselsteijn et al., 2000; Nicovich et al.,
2005; Baumgartner et al., 2006). Essentially, presence is fostered
by a feed-forward loop that seeks to match the user’s mental
representations of the real world with the virtual world (Schuemie
et al., 2001; Riva et al., 2003; Jäncke et al., 2009; Sjölie, 2014). With
the addition of presence, immersion becomes an over-inclusive
concept, thereby fueling the differentiation between immersion
and flow (e.g., Calleja, 2007; Nacke and Lindley, 2008; Kiili et al.,
2012).
However, presence and flow also present similarities. Witmer
and Singer (1998) suggested that the prerequisites for presence
are concentration, a sense of control, and the presence of
feedback, which are some of the same criteria Csikszentmihalyi
(1975, 1990) suggested for flow. In addition, both presence and
flow have been associated with decreased frontal brain activation
(e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Jäncke et al., 2009; Clemente et al., 2013).
Finally, the maintenance of these states is achieved through
selective attention (Witmer and Singer, 1998; Kober and Neuper,
2012; Harris et al., 2017a).
It is possible that presence operates separately from flow, and
that these two states share similar pre-conditions (Mollen and
Wilson, 2010). However, it is also possible that it is experienced
before flow (e.g., Novak et al., 2000; Skadberg and Kimmel,
2004; Weibel et al., 2008; Weibel and Wissmath, 2011). To
conclude, presence appears to refer to a different sensation
from the experience of immersion or flow. Arguably, flow and
immersion present the characteristics of an altered state of
consciousness, whereas presence does not (Brockmyer et al.,
2009). This distinction places presence at an early stage of video
game engagement (e.g., Weibel and Wissmath, 2011; Klasen et al.,
2012).
Neural Correlates Underlying Flow,
Immersion, and Presence
Although research seems to lack robust evidence for neural
patterns observable in flow, immersion, and presence, these
constructs may be sharing mutual neural correlates (Klasen
et al., 2012). However, this absence of patterns, specific to each
construct, may be due to the particularities of the tasks employed
in neural studies.
Flow has been associated with the dopaminergic system (Marr,
2001; Weber et al., 2009; De Manzano et al., 2013; Gyurkovics
et al., 2016), the sensorimotor network (Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005; Klasen et al., 2012), the combination of anterior cingulate
cortex and temporal pole (Yun et al., 2017), and reduced activity
in the prefrontal cortex (Gusnard et al., 2001; Dietrich, 2004;
Goldberg et al., 2006; Bavelier et al., 2012; Ulrich et al., 2014).
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) remains a debated brain structure
for its role in flow. Dietrich (2004) hypothesized that flow reflects
reduced frontal brain activity, and basal ganglia are deployed to
allow a state of automatic behavior and executive functioning – a
state known as transient hypofrontality (Dietrich, 2004).
The state of hypofrontality has not been consistently
confirmed (Yoshida et al., 2014; Harmat et al., 2015; Harris et al.,
2017b). In a recent study by Causse et al. (2017), the authors
found that the PFC activity is proportional to the task’s demands.
However, explicit control on the task may not be essential
during flow (e.g., Taylor, 2002; Dietrich, 2004; Bavelier et al.,
2012). Indeed, task automation is a distinctive feature of flow
(e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Quinn, 2005), and it progressively
loses its dependency on the PFC as expertise increases (Léger
et al., 2014). Klasen et al. (2012) recruited expert players and
a conjunction analysis of flow factors revealed a neocerebellar-
somatosensory network. Contrarily, Yoshida et al. (2014) found
increased activity in the left and right ventrolateral PFC during
flow. However, Yoshida et al. did not mention whether the
participants in their study were skilled players. This is an
important factor, in that flow may orchestrate neural networks
differently for novice and expert players (e.g., Kirschner and
Williams, 2014), with novice players requiring more explicit
control (e.g., Dietrich, 2004).
Similarly, evidence on the loss of self-reflective thoughts
during flow has revealed reduction in the activity of the medial
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PFC (Ulrich et al., 2014), whereas top-down attention implicated
in flow (Harris et al., 2017a) has been associated with the lateral
PFC and frontal eye fields (Buschman and Miller, 2007). These
contradicting findings should be interpreted with care; flow is
perhaps related to a localized hypofrontality, and not as universal
as Dietrich (2004) originally speculated (Harris et al., 2017b). We
suggest that frontal brain reduction may be a function of time. For
example, Yun et al. (2017) found that flow peaked after 25 min of
game playing. Hence, the player may require time to transition
from explicit to implicit control and to allocate attentional
resources that will make him/her resistant to distractions (e.g.,
Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Jennett, 2010; Bavelier et al.,
2012; Nuñez Castellar et al., 2016). Although similar observations
have not been proposed for immersion, the conceptual overlap
between flow and immersion (Brown and Cairns, 2004; Jennett
et al., 2008b) suggests that mutual substrates are at play.
Klasen et al. (2012) have additionally identified the role
of parietal regions (i.e., superior parietal cortex, precuneus
and intraparietal sulcus) in flow. However, an occipital and
frontoparietal network has also been found to underlie spatial
awareness in the first-person perspective (Vogeley and Fink,
2003; Vogeley et al., 2004) – Klasen et al. used a first-person video
game in their study. This finding is alarming in that concurrent
neural networks, specific to the task, may have been misidentified
for flow dimensions, as argued by Yoshida et al. (2014). Different
game genres can have specific cognitive demands (e.g., Latham
et al., 2013), and, as such, certain video games (e.g., strategy
games) might require more explicit control than others (e.g.,
Spence and Feng, 2010). These games might stimulate higher
prefrontal activation, without necessarily implying that it is
a substrate of flow. Importantly, the frontoparietal network’s
contribution to the experience of flow remains questionable
(Bavelier et al., 2012; Léger et al., 2014; Nah et al., 2017). The
responsibility of the frontoparietal network to allocate attentional
resources and the reduced activation thereof in video game
playing (Bavelier et al., 2012) suggests a functional unrelatedness
to flow. This is evident from flow’s dimension “merging of action
and awareness”, which signifies that attention is already focused
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).
On the other hand, presence has received limited focus on
its neural substrates. From the few studies investigating them,
presence has been consistently shown to rely on frontoparietal
connections (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2006, 2008; Jäncke et al.,
2009; Kober et al., 2012; Clemente et al., 2013). Jäncke et al. (2009)
found that the dorsolateral PFC not only does it regulate the sense
of presence but also its activation is inversely related to presence.
The authors suggested that the role of the frontoparietal network
is essential to presence because it governs motor simulations
extracted from the user’s internal representations (see also, Sjölie,
2014). Although motor simulation and execution have been
shown to have a strong overlap on a neural level (Hesslow, 2002),
research has shown distinct boundaries.
For instance, Ingvar and Philipson (1977) found that motor
simulation resided in a frontoparietal network, whereas motor
execution was associated with the Rolandic area. Similarly, Bauer
et al. (2015) found that a network, including the left parietal,
motor areas and the right PFC, underlay motor simulation,
whereas motor execution was related to left and right motor
areas. These findings are consistent with the alleged relation of
presence to action representation, or the ability to “do there” (e.g.,
Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008; Sjölie,
2014).
Presence has also been referred to as an “out-of-body”
experience (Rheingold, 1991), which is the equivalent of “being
there” (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). The user becomes
dissociated from the surrounding environment and feels like
they lose ownership of their body (Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005). Out-of-body experiences have been consistently shown
to involve the temporoparietal junction (Blanke and Arzy, 2005;
Bünning and Blanke, 2005; Blanke et al., 2005; De Ridder et al.,
2007), which gives rise to illusory self-location and perspective
(Blanke and Arzy, 2005). As such, presence has been argued to be
resembling to an out-of-body experience (Herbelin et al., 2016)
and links to the temporoparietal junction have been found in
studies of presence (Baumgartner et al., 2006, 2008).
These findings may not offer direct evidence for a comparison
between flow, immersion and presence. However, they shed light
on some differences. Flow is triggered during a task, thereby
implying motor execution. Contrarily, presence may be more
related to motor simulation (Sjölie, 2014). As mentioned above,
motor execution and simulation share functional correlates,
but they also present differences. This notion supports Weibel
and Wissmath (2011)’s insights on the distinction between flow
and presence. Moreover, presence appears to be a visceral
sensation and a primal mechanism of sensory integration (e.g.,
Riva and Waterworth, 2003), whereas flow and immersion
require increased mental effort in a task (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi,
1990; Brown and Cairns, 2004; Keller et al., 2011; Weibel and
Wissmath, 2011), thus functionally evolving over time (e.g.,
De Lafuente and Romo, 2006). In addition, the frontoparietal
network appears to be essential for the sense of presence (Kober
et al., 2012) but not for flow (Bavelier et al., 2012; Léger et al.,
2014; Nah et al., 2017).
Presence is challenging to isolate in video games, because
interactivity is their key component when compared to other
media forms (Granic et al., 2014). Perhaps, this very challenge
has sparked the unification between immersion and presence
(e.g., McMahan, 2003; Brown and Cairns, 2004; Calleja, 2007;
Kiili et al., 2012). Contrary to the growing body of literature
investigating the neural correlates of flow (e.g., Harris et al.,
2017b; Nah et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2017), there is, in our view,
a gap in the mechanisms underlying immersion, rendering their
distinction a conceptual challenge.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This focused review briefly addressed some conceptual challenges
in the literature of flow vs. immersion and their related concept
of presence in video gaming. Our aim was to challenge the
dominant view that flow is different from immersion. Although
the theoretical debate may seem innocuous, it extends to
experimental settings of substantial variability. Currently, there is
lacking evidence to suggest that a particular game design is better
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at triggering flow than immersion or vice versa (see, Nacke and
Lindley, 2008, 2009; Nacke et al., 2010).
Despite the abundance and overlap of self-reports (Nordin
et al., 2014; Denisova et al., 2016), research has not been
effective in diversifying the approaches toward the measurement
of flow and immersion as separate states. Importantly,
existing and future studies, guided by opposing interpretations
of the same phenomenon, may result in generalizability
issues.
To conclude, immersion and flow do not appear as
conceptually distinct, and their proposed differences are not
compelling enough to set immersion apart as a different
mental state. Although presence is enveloped in immersion,
it appears to be a distinct mental state, even on a neural
level. The remaining dimensions of immersion are very similar,
if not identical, to flow’s. Thus, we suggest that the terms
of flow and immersion can be used interchangeably, until
further behavioral and neurophysiological evidence is provided
in experimental settings specifically designed for disentangling
the two states.
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